

droidcon NYC 2014

Encrypt All The Things!



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Your Users' Bad Guys

- Different Users Have Different Security Concerns
- Do Not Assume All Users Are the Same as You
 - ...unless you are your only user
- Your Users' Collective Threats = Your Threats



ENCRYPT



ALL THE THINGS

INTENTION

vs.

WHAT PART OF "ENCRYPT ALL THE THINGS"



DID YOU NOT UNDERSTAND?

EXECUTION



Rest and Motion

Followed By More Rest, Because Motion is Tiring

- Securing Data at Rest = Local Storage
 - Databases
 - SharedPreferences
 - Other Types of Files
- Securing Data in Motion = Internet (mostly)
 - SSL
 - OTR



The Droid Is Not Enough

- Lock Screen?
 - Mechanical brute forcing
- Internal Storage?
 - Rooting
- Full-Disk Crypto?
 - Digital brute forcing



Your Objectives (One Hopes)

- Cheap and Easy Security
 - Only have so much time to budget
 - Aiming for “low hanging fruit”
- Effective Security
 - “Using CryptoLint, we performed a study on cryptographic implementations in 11,748 Android applications. Overall we find that 10,327 programs – 88% in total – use cryptography inappropriately. The raw scale of misuse indicates a widespread misunderstanding of how to properly use cryptography in Android development.”



You're Doing It Wrong

- Hardcoded Passphrases
- Manually Seeding SecureRandom
 - ...with a hardcoded seed
- Hardcoded Salts
- Insufficient Key Generation Iterations
- Non-Random Initialization Vectors



Introducing SQLCipher

- SQLCipher
 - Modified version of SQLite
 - AES-256 encryption by default, of all data
 - Relatively low overhead
 - Cross-platform
 - BSD license

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Introducing SQLCipher

- SQLCipher Security
 - Customizable encryption algorithm
 - Based on OpenSSL libcrypto
 - Individual pages encrypted, with own initialization vector
 - Message authentication code (MAC) per page, to detect tampering
 - Hashed passphrase (PBKDF2) for key
 - 4,000 iterations, moving to 64,000 for 3.0



Introducing SQLCipher

- SQLCipher for Android
 - NDK-compiled binaries
 - Drop-in replacement classes for Android's SQLite classes
 - SQLiteDatabase
 - SQLiteOpenHelper
 - Etc.
 - Modify your code, third-party libraries also using SQLite



Integrating SQLCipher

- Step #1: Add to Project
 - Download ZIP file from:
<http://sqlcipher.net/downloads/>
 - Copy ZIP's `assets/` into project's `assets/`
 - Copy ZIP's `libs/` into project's `libs/`



Integrating SQLCipher

- Step #2: Replace Import Statements
 - Eclipse
 - Delete all `android.database.*` and `android.database.sqlite.*` imports
 - Use Ctrl-Shift-O and choose the `net.sqlcipher` equivalents



Integrating SQLCipher

- Step #2: Replace Import Statements
 - Outside of Eclipse
 - Replace all occurrences of `android.database` with `net.sqlcipher`, revert back as needed
 - Replace all occurrences of `android.database.sqlite` with `net.sqlcipher.database`



Integrating SQLCipher

- Step #3: Supply Passphrases
 - SQLiteDatabase `openOrCreateDatabase()`,
etc.
 - SQLiteOpenHelper `getReadableDatabase()`
and `getWritableDatabase()`
 - Collect passphrase from user via your own UI



Integrating SQLCipher

- Step #4: Testing
 - Tests should work when starting with a clean install
 - No existing unencrypted database
- Step #5: Beer!
 - Hooray, beer!



Integrating SQLCipher

- Other Integration Issues
 - Upgrading to encryption
 - ContentProvider
 - Can work, but need to get passphrase to it before using the database (e.g., `call()`)



Integrating SQLCipher

- About the Bloat
 - 4MB base
 - Additional ~5MB for x86
 - Additional ~3MB for ARM
 - Why?
 - Complete independent copy of SQLite
 - Static library implementation of OpenSSL
 - Independent copy of ICU collation ruleset



Passphrases

- Use Case: Defending the User's Data
 - User knows and supplies passphrase
- Non-Use Case: DRM
 - Developer knows and supplies passphrase
 - Trivially hackable to discover a baked-in passphrase
 - Rooted device users can get at generated passphrases




Passphrases

- Passphrase Entry Pain
 - Users do not like typing long passwords
 - Result = weaker quality
 - Option: “diceware”
 - Choose ~6 words from stock list
 - Can offer scrolling lists, auto-complete to help speed data entry
 - Downside: more annoying for accessibility



Passphrases



~28 BITS OF ENTROPY

□□□□□□□□ □

□□□ □□□

□□□□ □

$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS:
EASY

WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE 0s WAS A ZERO?

AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL...




DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER:
HARD

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Passphrases




~ 44 BITS OF ENTROPY

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$2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS:
HARD



THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

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Passphrases

- Multi-Factor Authentication
 - Passphrase generated in code from user-supplied pieces
 - Organization options
 - Simple concatenation
 - Concatenation with factor prefix, un-typeable divider characters




Passphrases

- Multi-Factor Authentication Objectives
 - Longer passphrase without as much user input
 - Help defeat casual attacks
 - Need all factors to access via your UI
 - Otherwise, need to brute-force



Passphrases



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Passphrases

- Multi-Factor Authentication Sources
 - NFC tag
 - QR code
 - Paired Bluetooth device
 - Wearable device app
 - Biometrics (e.g., fingerprint scanner)
 - Formal, fancy-pants enterprise-grade stuff




IOCipher: Locking Down Files

- Virtual Encrypted Filesystem
 - Backed by a SQLCipher database
 - Replacement classes for `java.io.File`, etc.
 - Feel of working with files, with transparent encryption
 - Designed for user-known passphrases
 - Facebook Conceal: generated passphrase, but only makes external storage as secure as internal storage



IOCipher Stack



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Moving to IOCipher

- Connect to your encrypted disk's file using `new VirtualFileSystem(dbFile)`
- Mount it with a password using `VirtualFileSystem.mount(password)`
- Replace the relevant import statements:
 - `import info.guardianproject.iocipher.File;`
 - `import info.guardianproject.iocipher.FileOutputStream;`
 - `import info.guardianproject.iocipher.FileReader;`
 - `import info.guardianproject.iocipher.IOCipherFileChannel;`
 - `import info.guardianproject.iocipher.VirtualFileSystem;`



```
import info.guardianproject.iocipher.File;
import info.guardianproject.iocipher.FileOutputStream;
import info.guardianproject.iocipher.VirtualFileSystem;

File dbFile = new File(getFilesDir(), "/myfiles.db");
VirtualFileSystem vfs = new VirtualFileSystem(dbFile);

vfs.mount(yourPasswordFromTheUserGoesHere);

File file = new File(dirPath);

File[] files = file.listFiles();
```

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NetCipher: Locking Down Teh Interwebs

- Tor Integration
 - Check to see if Orbot is installed, help get it installed
 - Help in proxying HTTPS/SOCKS requests through Orbot
 - Help in accessing Tor Hidden Services



Summary

- Consider Encryption
 - ...even if you don't think you need it
- SQLCipher: Easiest Option for Encrypted Database
 - ...if you can live with the APK footprint
- IOCipher: Easiest Option for Encrypted “Files”
- NetCipher: Tor FTW!

